2021: What A Year

Ok, I’ll admit it…I wasn’t prepared for the impact that returning to work in person would have on my life and on TRET. Now, 2021 is coming to an end and I find myself yet again writing another end-of-the-year post in which I am apologizing for the recent inactivity on this awesome blog. This time, however, it’s a little different.

2021 marked 10 years since I published the first post on this blog. At the time I was real estate agent and teacher who was about to begin law school and was looking for ways to better understand real estate modeling and real estate finance. I hoped to create a community of like-minded people so that we could explore ways to better value real estate properties and mortgages and discuss the market. Ten years and many experiences later this blog has grown and transformed into a general forum on all things real estate and I am amazed at the direction it has taken. 2021 has been an amazing year for TRET, so let’s take a look at the year in review.

 The Market:

What a crazy year for real estate! 2021 started with an insane housing market in which demand greatly outpaced supply. The pandemic created so much pent-up demand that in some markets, average time on the market was less than two weeks. This state of affairs, was clearly a carry-over from the effects of the 2020 quarantine. As the year progressed, housing prices rose, however so did inflation, depressing any true wealth gains.

Inflation and pent-up demand places the housing market in a strange position, as inflation rises the cost of construction making an the housing supply unprofitable. On the other hand inflation reduces the real gains from selling property, which also makes selling property less desirable. The Fed’s response to this situation and the market in general will be to raise rates, which will lower demand, making acquisitions more expensive. This will lead to a market with inflated prices and high interest rates—a rare market in which buying is undesirable and selling is only mildly incentivized. For housing, 2022 is looking to be a slow year for housing as the market returns to normalcy. That said, the traditional approach to sales and acquisitions will likely be the most successful. CNN Business has a similar assessment of the market, but with a slightly different conclusion. Feel free to check out their article here.

Commercial real estate had a unique year as well, but for different reasons. The year began with depressed asset prices across all classes as businesses struggled to project their physical needs after the pandemic. Although asset values were down across the board, multifamily properties performed the best and proved to be the best way to the whether the storm. Then something even more interesting happened…seemingly out of the blue, institutional investors woke-up and began acquiring everything.

A surge of institutional acquisitions took place during the second and third quarters of 2021. Multifamily, retail and industrial properties started to surge. Office properties were being left behind, but many municipalities began to facilitate their conversion into multifamily properties in order facilitate even more activity in market. Then, just as quickly as it came, the wave was over. In retrospect, it is clear that the major players in the market were looking to move money into real estate to avoid the effects of inflation, but at the time, the frothy commercial market felt very much like a feeding frenzy.

The Podcast:

The 10^th Anniversary of TRET saw the start of TRET: The Podcast. Although it certainly wasn’t an easy journey, recording the podcast episodes with my childhood friend and real estate extraordinaire, Conrad Bastien, Jr. was a lot of fun. TRET also branched into TRET Shorts, which were also a lot of fun to make. Expect more in future. The podcast was an opportunity to explore a number of topics in a manner that required even more depth and research than would be required by a blog post. Moreover, the chemistry created on that podcast cannot be duplicated. Please feel free to check out our episodes, which are posted here and on this blog.

The Growth:

This year has also seen TRET expand into the area of guest contributors. We were privileged to benefit from the perspectives of a number of guest authors, who allowed us to expand our content. I am personally thankful for the contributions as they served a motivation to keep TRET going.

So after a year like 2021, where do you go? The only answer is up. Look for more and better from TRET in addition to a migration to a new platform. TRET is growing, we’d love you all to be a part.

Improvement Options You Should Consider to Increase the Value of Your Home

Please enjoy this article from guest author Suzie Wilson of Happierhome.net

Unless you plan to sell your house “as-is,” when you’re ready to list your home, you have a lot of work to do. While there are some benefits of keeping the original fixtures and features of a home, staying up to date with the latest home trends is crucial in selling as quickly as possible. The good news is you can get the job done with some simple upgrades. Below are a few that you need to consider.

Press ‘Home’ — Selling Properties With Smart Tech

 

Please enjoy this article from guest author Suzie Wilson  of  Happierhome.net

There are many advantages to home automation: ease of use, better accessibility, and let’s face it — there’s something cool about a fireplace that starts up when you clap. What you may not have foreseen, however, are the benefits that technology provides when selling a property.

The Role of Tech

 In almost all areas of life, it’s clear that the pandemic has increased our reliance on tech. This is no less true in the housing market, where the need to actually step inside a property has been somewhat reduced by the use of 3D walkthroughs, video-chat tours, virtual open houses, and Zoom realtor consultations. This is good news for prospective sellers as, in the wake of COVID, housing sales have bounced back to levels unseen since pre-2008. If you are looking to sell your property, physical limitations need not slow you down.

How to Navigate Legal Structures in Real Estate

Stephon Martin

As the real estate market attempts to move past the COVID-19 pandemic and progress toward a “New Normal,” federal moratoriums have become a way of life in real estate. Navigating the legal landscape of a local market has always been part of creating wealth in real estate. Every real estate marketplace is subject to its own local laws, as well as its state law and federal law. At the highest level, real estate investment and development is a game of understanding the rules—the applicable laws, ordinances, building codes, etc., and knowing when you can bend them in your favor through variances, court cases and lobbying. Although much of this may seem a little nefarious, it need not be, as our legal system was designed to establish a certain set of default rules for real estate, with a mechanism to allow for change in the event that either some rules are inapplicable generally or inadequate for a given situation. That stated, below are some ways to capitalize, navigate or at least survive the laws of any real estate market:

Let’s Not Forget the Expenses

When either forecasting, underwriting or simply checking the figures on a deal, it is important to account for expenses. The mere mention of the word expenses immediately brings certain images to the mind of most real estate professionals, such as taxes, labor and materials. Proper accounting for such expenses, however, can make or break a financial model and skew underwriting assumptions. That said, it is important to employ the following practices to ensure that your expense estimates are accurate and reflective of the market.

How To Approach A Defaulting Second Mortgage

Default happens, hopefully not often, but it is a fact of lending. Upon default, however, a holder of a second mortgage must find an objective, value-driven manner in which to evaluate its options. Unfortunately, in many instances second position lienholders opt for one of two extreme approaches—accepting a nominal amount in exchange for the release of the lien or demanding an unreasonably high sum for satisfaction of the lien. Both approaches are harmful for different reasons. Despite such prevalent behavior, with proper management, a defaulting second mortgage can provide a lienholder with a number of options.

Real Estate Asset Managers

In the real estate industry, there are many different professions, each with its unique role. I have focused on different real estate professions in the past on this site, so let us take a look at more obscure and lesser known profession--the Real Estate Asset Manager.

Role of a Real Estate Asset Manager

Although the title Asset Manager has multiple meanings in the world of finance, the Real Estate Asset Manager has a specific task—to manage properties resulting from mortgage default or property acquisition on behalf of a real estate investor, whole loan investor or mortgage servicer. Typically, real estate asset managers maintain a network of vendors, such as contractors, real estate brokers, real estate marketing companies and appraisers in order to maintain, market and sell properties under their management. Resultantly, much of the role of the Real Estate Asset Manager consists of vendor management.

Most real estate asset managers work with mortgage servicers through either a client or a subsidiary relationship. For example, Altisource, the nation’s largest real estate asset manager, is an independent but related company to Ocwen Loan Servicing, one of the nation's largest mortgage servicers, whereas SingleSource, another well-known real estate asset manager, is a wholly independent company that is hired by some of the largest loan servicers. Given the size of the whole loan portfolios of the larger mortgage servicers, many find hiring a real estate asset manager more cost effective than building and managing property vendor networks and tracking sales activity.

Monte Carlo Mortgages

In his book Mortgage Wars, former CFO of Fannie Mae, Timothy Howard explains how Fannie's realization that mortgages behave like bonds with embedded call options revolutionized its ability to value its portfolio and manage risk. Prior to this change in thinking, Fannie Mae's methods for reserving capital were consistently shown to be inadequate. Today, the valuation of mortgages and mortgage-related securities as bonds with embedded calls is nothing new.

A call option is a type of derivative, which conveys the right (but not the obligation) to purchase another financial instrument (the underlying asset) for a specified price (the strike price) at a specified time (the expiration date). Purchasing a call option offers the right to purchase the underlying asset and selling a call options impose the obligation of delivering the underlying asset at the strike price on the execution date.

Mortgages are freely refinanceable at any point. In this way, they function as bonds in which the payments from the homeowner serve as the coupon payment and the ability to refinance serves as a call option sold to the homeowner by the mortgage holder. Typically the refinance rates increase as interest rates decrease. Although mortgage prepayment penalties are included in mortgages to discourage refinancing, a large enough drop in interest rates can make refinancing worthwhile to a property owner in spite of the prepayment penalty. For mortgage and MBS investors, prepayments are undesirable. Given that most mortgage investors look to invest anywhere between 5 and 30 years, an early decline in interest rates can leave many investors with cash from prepayments that must be invested in a market offering lower interests rates. This undesirable situation is the double-edged sword of prepayment risk for mortgages.

Why Historical Beta Does Not Always Work For Real Estate

Real estate investment is typically viewed as an essential part of any balanced portfolio. Its immutable characteristics, such as its relatively long pricing cycles and its above average returns, cause real estate to be seen as a stable asset. On the other hand, due to its sensitivity to interest rates, its lack of liquidity at the property level and its longer periods appreciation, exposure to the real estate can also serve as an inflationary hedge. Although real estate exposure may be purchased for any number of reasons, the risk profile of real estate assets is of interest to most, if not all, real estate investors.

The ways in which the risk profile of real estate has been expressed vary from the informal to the highly computational. On the most informal end of the spectrum, owner-operators of property frequently concern themselves with the tax consequences and appreciation of the property, content to face changes in the market or externalities, as they come. On the opposite end of the spectrum are portfolio managers and fixed-income investors, who seek quantifiable means to express the volatility of real estate securities. One such attempt at quantifying the volatility of real estate and its related securities is through the use of real estate's historical beta.

Who Should Value the Property: BPO's Versus Appraisals

Appraisers and brokers are frequently considered integral components of a real estate transaction. Their roles are clearly defined in residential real estate, however, in commercial real estate, both professions frequently cross into a number disciplines. It isn’t uncommon for a commercial real estate broker to manage a property, arrange financing, market mortgage notes and even raise funds. Commercial appraisers are often asked to inspect buildings, estimate repair costs, estimate the value of construction materials and determine replacement costs. Brokers not only procure parties and assist in the negotiations of transactions, they are also frequently called on to value properties from a number of perspectives.

In light of the various demands on both the real estate broker and appraiser, there may be some questions as to the differences in the valuation reports that each professional issues. It has been my experience that a broker price opinion (BPO) and a property appraisal each serve different, but useful purposes. A broker price opinion typically reflects the value for which a property will generate either a successful lease or sale. The opinion can also suggest a value at which the property will generate substantial interest on the market. An appraisal, however, is typically useful as a justification of a given price, as may arise under a purchase contract, after an assessment or upon any other instance of valuation. Better stated, a broker price opinion can be seen as a forward looking valuation and the appraisal can be seen as a justification or backward looking valuation.

Return on Equity

Let’s keep this post short and sweet, by discussing Return on Equity (ROE). ROE is a measure of the rate at which a property’s after tax cash flow has performed in relation to either the equity in a property or initial investment. As a result, ROE has two definitions that yield different values:

1)   ROE = Cash Flow After Taxes/Initial Investment

2)   ROE = Cash Flow After Taxes/(Market Value – Mortgage Balance)

The first definition tends to be more useful to understand the first year of property ownership, where there is a negligible amount of mortgage reduction and market value has not changed much. The second definition is more useful to track the growth of ROE over time.

It is interesting to note, however, that as both cash flow and mortgage principal reduction increases over time, ROE decreases. There is a school of thought that advocates monetizing equity for reinvestment as ROE decreases. I tend to disagree, since I view debt reduction and equity build-up as benefits that must be considered. Additionally, ROE should not influence the decisions that one makes about other benefits of owning investment property--depreciation, tax shelter, appreciation, and improved utility.

What do you think?

IRR: Its Meaning, Its Uses, Its Benefits, Its Limitations and Capital Accumulation

It is time for this blog to take another step toward legitimacy in the ever growing world of real estate blogs. I am now going to address the frequently used and highly touted real estate metric of Internal Rate of Return. I remember being mesmerized by IRR when I was first learning about commercial real estate metrics. It was introduced to me as the magic number that could explain the true return of a property. I have since learned to respect it as one of the many tools that can be used to understand the return value of an investment property or ABS, while understanding its limitations.

In the interest of brevity, I am going to explain IRR as it pertains to investment property. I will not get into its uses in RMBS and CMBS bonds, as I will save that for a later post. I also will not go into detail on the iterative, successive-approximations technique by which the IRR value is derived. I am on the fence as to whether or not such a discussion would be helpful to this blog. Now that I have told you what I will not do, please allow me to begin my discussion of IRR.

Net Present Value, Discouted Cash Flow, and Profitability Index: Their Uses, Benefits and Drawbacks

It’s good to finally post again. I have recently finished reading What Every Real Estate Investor Needs to Know About Cash Flow…and 36 Other Key Financial Measures, by Frank Gallinelli. Gallinelli’s book is a well-known, highly respected “must read” for those who are looking to understand the basics of commercial real estate property valuation. Having read a number of books on real estate, I have come to two realizations—1) Books on investment property metrics and valuations, by and large, are very similar, 2) I secretly enjoy reading books about real estate. At first, I thought I was reading for informational purposes, but having read about NOI for at least the 20^th time, I have finally admitted to myself that I enjoy doing so. Now let’s get to the meat and potatoes.

Discounted Cash Flow (DCF), Net Present Value (NPV) and Profitability Index are all measures of the value of investment property cash flow. The DCF is derived from the sum of a property’s cash flows, present or projected, discounted to the present. Discounting the value of a cash flow is necessary, due to the time value of money, which accounts for the fact that money today is more valuable than money in the future. An in depth discussion of the time value of money is beyond the scope of this post, but I am more than happy to write a post on it, if I receive a few request for one in the comments below.

Residential Mortgage Backed Securities: How They're Supposed To Work

Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS) are the fuel that powers our country's mortgage market. Their role in mortgage lending is not complicated, despite the fact that accurately pricing them requires in-depth knowledge of stochastic processes, matrix math, as well as a solid understanding of partial differential equations. I recently found a great article on-line by American University's Peter Chinloy that explains the how RMBS functions and the many of the assumptions that undergird them.

The long and short of it is that RMBS expands the lending capacity of financial institutions by allowing them to sell the home loans that they originate to purchasers on the secondary market to other institutions, exchanging the cash flow from the loans for cash for their balance sheets. The purchasers of these loans then package them and create investment vehicles or conduits. Investors are then offered an opportunity to participate in the cash flows that comes from the payment of these loans through the purchase of bonds issued on behalf of a conduit. These bonds are categorized as RMBS. They offer the investor exposure to the returns and activity of the housing market without the idiosyncrasies of property ownership or the capital  and labor requirements of lending. Moreover, a great deal of investment grade RMBS is guaranteed and can be insured. Add in the historically low home loan default rates with the lower capital reserve requirements of for insurance companies holding RMBS and it seems like a solid investment.

By now, the story of RMBS and its function has been told in many different places since the beginning of the economic downturn, so I harbor no delusion that what I have written thus far is not already widely understood. Chinloy's article, though written 16 years ago, offers a refreshing explanation of the purpose of each component of the mortgage lending system. It also illustrates the mathematical assumptions of lending behavior, important variables and basic RMBS pricing that can be easily used in Excel.

Chinloy describes the differences in private and agency RMBS that were once key to residential loan securitization. Originally, GNMA or agency RMBS was the outlet for borrowers that had less capital or lower credit scores than was required of conventional loans. Loans that fell under the purview of GNMA, known as FHA, VA or FmHA loans, were not only insured by FHA, VA or FmHA, but they also had default premiums priced into the mortgage payment. GNMA assumed  that the lower access to credit and/or capital typical of the borrowers of these loans would sever to lessen the frequency of prepayment through early payoff or refinance. Prepayment is generally undesirable to the bond holders of RMBS products, because it lowers the interest rate carry of each prepaid mortgage, reducing the amount of cash flow from that note and thus reducing the cash flow to the bond holder. The insurance premiums built into the loans covered prepayment due to default and the entire system was guaranteed with government credit. The added risk of the borrowers of an agency loan was therefore offset by the government's guarantee and the bond holder was generally assured that loan prepayment would be low.

Conventional mortgages, on the other hand required higher down-payments and were typically given by borrowers that had more access to capital (let's remember the borrowers give mortgages and banks give loans). Prepayment risk is generally higher via early payoffs or refinances, especially as interest rates tended downward. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the largest purchasers of conventional mortgages, insured all mortgage collateral and the payments on their RMBS issues, in order to reduce this risk. The money from this insurance was both built into the price of the RMBS, but was also guaranteed by both organizations' access to a $2.5 billion credit line from the government. Principal Mortgage Insurance (PMI) was also employed in cases where the borrower's loan-to-value, LTV, exceeded 80%, making the loan more of a risk for default. PMI, however, only covered the difference between market value and mortgage value.

One of the most ironic aspects of the article is its discussion of private RMBS securitization, which it describes as a highly risky and generally below investment grade for a number of reasons. We know that this view of private securitization was largely ignored during the real estate bubble and that not only did private RMBS overtake the RMBS market, but also the resultant demand for mortgage notes led to the replacement of PMI. This practice traded insurance for increased exposure to risk from the same asset. Understanding the function of PMI, default rates and down payment requirements from the perspective of RMBS issuances, allows one to see why the once widespread practice of "piggyback loans" and "no money down" financing was a recipe for disaster. Not only did such lending practices dilute the relationship of the borrower to the property, making default much more likely, but they also eroded many of the insurance fail-safes of the private home mortgage lending system that insured the private RMBS payments to the investors in case of default. Additionally, piggyback loans, created two instances of default for a property instead of one, doubling the effect of default of each similarly financed property on the secondary market and on the related securities markets.

I could write a book about my reaction to Chinloy's article. I particularly like his analysis of mortgage payments and defaults as options, which lends borrowing behavior to derivative analysis. I also appreciate his in-depth explanation of forward and backward solving models for pricing RMBS. I am not sure which one I prefer, but I must say that I am somewhat partial to the type of analysis that the backward solving model employs. Though both types of models are useful tools, forward solving models are inherently more optimistic.  There is also a key point made on page 19 of the article regarding Fannie Mae's finding that properties with more than 10% negative equity have a high likelihood of default. Chinloy's mention of the lack of accounting for borrower liquidity in most RMBS pricing models is also noteworthy.

I do want to point out that some of the references in this article are dated. Due to mortgage acceleration clauses, new FHA, VA and FmHA mortgages are no longer assumable, therefore all of the sections about the assumablity of mortgages and selling the mortgage with the house are no longer relevant. It is also clear that Chinloy had no indication of the explosion of private and conventional loan and RMBS origination that would begin to take place just 3 or 4 years after the writing of his article and thus some of his predictions seem disconnected with what actually transpired in the real estate and securities markets. Chinloy, however, offers a cogent overview of the system of RMBS issuance that existed up until the late 1990's. It is clear that had this system been more clearly understood and followed by lenders, investment banks, investors and RMBS originators much of the calamity that recently befell our financial system could have either been predicted or avoided.

Capitalization Rates: Prespective on Their True Meaning

Cap rates are one of the most referenced metrics in all of commercial real estate. Unfortunately, they are also one of the most misunderstood metrics in our industry. I genuinely believe that this misunderstanding comes from the diversity of significant players in commercial real estate. Unlike the equities and debt markets, commercial real estate does not require the presence of a financial institution to mitigate the flow of information and to establish standard practices. Moreover, the equities markets are heavily regulated to insure honesty, transparency and equality of information. The debt markets, though not transparent, however, are generally restricted to institutional investors and high net worth individuals. Commercial real estate sales and acquisitions have no such regulations or restrictions and therefore do not require knowledge of the real estate metrics and their related mathematics to effectively transact. Many commercial property owners purchase properties based on simplified formulas, local knowledge of the property, purchasing rituals or merely "gut feelings." The presence of such transaction activity lends to frequent misuse of real estate metrics.

Despite the misunderstanding of real estate mathematics amongst a certain sector of the real estate market, savvy real estate purchasers, appraisers, institutional buyers and real estate analyst are typically comfortable with the metrics used to describe property performance. The Capitalization Rate or cap rate of a property is one such metric that can offer a wealth of information about the performance of a property and the market assumptions of the seller.

The cap rate expresses the annual rate of return of a property's net operating income given its market value or purchase price. Since debt service, income and expense escalations, and tax considerations, it is not the most reliable method of determining annual return. If properly calculated, however, the cap rate can be compared with a metric of opportunity costs, such as the Weighted Average Cost of Capital from the world of equities to determine the desirability of the property given alternative investments.

I recently found a paper written for the Journal of Real Estate Research that explains the components of cap rate. It explains that cap rates are significantly influenced by the debt and equities markets, but contain significant time lags, given the illiquidity of real estate. The paper asserts that there are 4 components to a cap rate: the risk free rate (here measured by 3 month treasuries, usually measured by the rate of 30 yr. treasuries); a component composed of the market cost of debt divided by the property value (let's call it the property's market LTV) and the spread of a BAA rated bond (lowest possible investment grade); a component comprised of the 1 minus the property's market LTV, the equity spread (as measured by the performance of the S&P 500) and a volatility coefficient beta for stocks (measured by the covariance between real estate equity returns and market returns, divided by the variance of market returns); finally, the negative of the growth rate.

Cap rates are also typically expressed as the discount rate less the property growth rate. Following this logic, one can collapse all of the above components of the cap rate, except for the growth rate negative, into the cap rate's given discount rate. Therefore, given a cap rate, one can look up the risk free rate, the market cost of debt, the BAA bond spread, the equity spread and the equity volatility beta and find the growth rate of the property assumed. All of the aforementioned components are regularly published.

Knowing the assumed growth rate of a property allows for a deeper understanding of how that property is priced and how it is expected to perform. It also explains the inverse relationship between cap rate and price, as a larger cap rate assumes more negative growth or appreciation, as it is called in real estate.

One caveat to both this discussion and the paper referenced is that I am not convinced that cap rates are significantly influenced by the changes in the equities market, although equities are an appropriate asset by which opportunity costs can be measured. The influence of both property REIT's and mortgage REIT's as well as the proximity of the stock market's historical returns (hovering around 8.5%) to historical cap rates (around 7.6%) all make the case that the equities market has some influence on cap rates. Given real estate's local nature and the idiosyncrasies of each property type, however, it is difficult to believe that the link between cap rates and equities can remain significant in the face of more influential determinants of the property's value. I prefer to think of the equities portion of the equation as open to be replaced by whatever alternative investment is feasible to the purchaser at the time the cap rate is figured, accompanied by its related volatility beta.

Commercial Notes and Properties

Commercial mortgage note valuations are distinguished from residential note valuations in that commercial notes, and by extension their related CMBS bonds and derivatives are based on the performance of the underwritten property, whereas residential notes and their related securities rely heavily on the financial behavior of the borrower. Many commercial mortgages are non-recourse to the borrower and often the borrower of a commercial mortgage is an entity, which can be dissolved and disappear upon insolvency or bankruptcy. It is also not unheard of to find commercial lenders and servicers managing properties obtained through foreclosure for a number of years to collect the cash flow from the property until it is sold. Bank-owned residential properties, however, are generally seen as liabilities to be sold at the highest price, as quickly as possible.

Given the non-recourse nature of most commercial financing and the strong consideration of the performance of the property, many commercial note valuation financial models are very similar to commercial asset acquisition models, with a number of lending considerations, such as debt yield, added. The closely related nature of commercial note and commercial property valuations has led me to title this post "Commercial Mortgage Notes and Properties." There are a number of elements that are essential components of both types of models. First, an asset description worksheet detailing the asset and its financing is key. This worksheet should be flexible enough to run a number of quick scenarios or "stress tests" and should have some basic information that it is being fed from other worksheets in the model.

The next essential component of a good commercial mortgage and property model is a rent role worksheet. This worksheet can be separate from combined with a lease expiration table. A clear presentation of such information will allow one to quickly evaluate the condition of the property's rent role in order to understand the flexibility of the asset and how it will perform over the life of the acquisition or note. The next component is a valuation table that should compare a number of different methods of valuing the worth of the property. Area cap rate, replacement costs, and appraised value are some of the many ways to find the value of an asset.  Another important component is an expense and profit escalation table. This table will allow one to project the possible value of the asset over the life of the deal. These projections will be essential to obtaining the asset's net present value (NPV) and for obtaining a rate for the internal rate of return (IRR). I also like to add a worksheet that attempts to predict how this asset as a note will behave if it were securitized with similar assets, worse assets or better assets. Access to the rating agencies' projected returns for each asset class can be very helpful in building and using such a worksheet.

Having discussed the relative de-emphasis of the credit worthiness of the borrower of a commercial mortgage, I must clarify that the borrower credit history is still important to commercial mortgage underwriting and note valuation. Unworthy borrowers lower the value of commercial note, as any foreclosure process, even a "springing-lock box" mortgage, deed of trust or bank foreclosure mortgage (the three least expensive mortgages to foreclose) can be costly in terms of lost cash flow and lost time. Management costs will also accrue after the foreclosure process is complete. No lender wishes to underwrite a deal that will lead to foreclosure, as it would be cheaper for the lender to simply purchase the property, therefore borrower risk must be evaluated and priced through an appropriate interest rate. Borrower credit-worthiness, therefore, should not be absent from your commercial mortgage note model.

Having posted this cursory overview of Commercial Mortgage Note and Asset modeling, I welcome your comments on this or any other post on this blog.