Showing posts with label default. Show all posts
Showing posts with label default. Show all posts

Friday, July 27, 2018

How To Approach A Defaulting Second Mortgage


Default happens, hopefully not often, but it is a fact of lending. Upon default, however, a holder of a second mortgage must find an objective, value-driven manner in which to evaluate its options. Unfortunately, in many instances second position lienholders opt for one of two extreme approaches—accepting a nominal amount in exchange for the release of the lien or demanding an unreasonably high sum for satisfaction of the lien. Both approaches are harmful for different reasons. Despite such prevalent behavior, with proper management, a defaulting second mortgage can provide a lienholder with a number of options.


So, You Agreed To Be Second

Financing a second mortgage is making a conscious decision to maintain an interest in a property that is subject to the interests of the first lienholder. The most cogent concern of a second lender is that upon default of the first mortgage, all of the second lienholder's interest can be extinguished. Such subordination is not only a concern at default, but an ongoing concern, as any changes to the property or its rights that the second position lender would like to make may possibly trigger a default in the first mortgage. 

Upon default, the relationship between the first and second lienholders undergoes a slight alteration. To understand this shift, it is probably most beneficial to think of a second position lien as converting into an option or right of first refusal upon default. When either mortgage is in default, the second lien holder has to assess whether it wishes to incur the cost of litigation, in the case of the second lien’s default, or satisfaction, in the case of a default on the first mortgage. In the same manner, the money lent for the second lien can similarly be seen as the cost of the option, which bears interest for the lender. Viewing its lien from this property rights perspective will enable the second lien holder to conduct an objective risk-weighted cost-benefit analysis of the second mortgage.

Which Approach Should Be Taken Upon Default?

When it comes to defaulting second mortgages, objectivity is essential. Accepting a nominal payoff leads to lost profits. Alternatively, overly aggressive demands for a payoff will lead to either foreclosure of the first lien position and extinguishment or a longer period of nonpayment, followed by ownership of the property subject to the first mortgage. An active approach is necessary to avoid entering either situation unwillingly. Second lien holders should assess the value of the property and determine if the remaining equity after satisfaction of the first lien and additional litigation/acquisition costs makes the exercising of the lien holder’s rights worth the cost of doing so. In addition to this course of action, it is important for the second lienholder to understand the secondary market pricing for performing second mortgages, defaulting mortgages and the typical payoff discount for defaulting second mortgage in the property’s local area. The state of title of property is also an important determining factor. Armed, with this information, a second position lienholder can make an informed decision on how it will proceed upon default.

Unfortunately, second lienholders and their authorized agents are not always optimally informed at the time of default, leading to frequent instances of idiosyncratic behavior. That said, I thought it prudent to provide my take on how to approach the default of a second position mortgage. Please feel free to provide your prospective on the matter below.

Friday, January 29, 2016

Same Mechanism, Different Crisis

I recently read William Seidman's book Full Faith and Credit, which contains a detailed explanation of the S&L crash of the early 1990's that was spurred on by a crash of the US commercial real estate market. William Seidman was head of the FDIC at the time of the crash. A day after I finished the book, I walked by my bookshelf and noticed the book Bull By Its Horns, by Shelia Bair, the chairman of the FDIC during the 2007/2008 financial crisis, when it hit me--both publications are the same book written nearly 20 years apart. Although each of the authors have their individual differences, they are both similar in that they were Republican chairmen (or is the term chairpeople?), serving during Republican presidencies, who presided over the fallout of a banking crisis that resulted in the largescale nationalization of private assets and companies.

The political affiliation of both former heads of the FDIC is tangential to my point, however, I mention it to make two observations. The first observation is that both Mr. Seidman and Ms. Bair are linked by political party. The second is that the economic climate forced them to participate in the goverment takeover of private companies and their assets, an idea that is antithetical to most Republican ideology.

Although one of the chief duties of the FDIC is to close failing institutions and liquidate their assets, under most normal economic circumstances, this duty of the FDIC is either carried out infrequently or confined to a certain sector of the market. Both the S&L crisis of early 1990's and the Great Recession of the late first decade 2000's, however, forced the FDIC and other government agencies to either take ownership an stake or fully national financial institutions in a large, systemic manner.

Sunday, October 4, 2015

Mortgage Backed Securities and Personal Bankruptcy

At long last, the end of the series!

Personal bankruptcy is usually filed by an individual for very different reasons than corporate bankruptcies. Whereas the primary motivation behind filing a business bankruptcy may be protection of the business or satisfaction of debts, personal bankruptcies are frequently filed for asset protection, in addition to satisfaction of debts.

The two sections of the bankruptcy code that apply to personal bankruptcies are chapter 7 and chapter 13. As with business bankruptcies, chapter 7 for personal bankruptcies is a process of liquidation and seeks include all non-exempt assets of the petitioner in the bankruptcy estate in order to liquidate them to pay off debts. Chapter 13, on the other hand, seeks to reorganize the debt of a petitioner pursuant to a payment plan, which typically last from 3 to 5 years.

Tuesday, March 3, 2015

Special Purpose Entity Bankruptcy Concerns for Mortgage-Backed Securities

Let us continue the bankruptcy theme begun in my last post and discuss the effects of Special Purpose Entity (SPE) bankruptcies and their effect on mortgage-backed securities. Obviously, most bond covenants designate the bankruptcy of a SPE an event of default and restrict the likelihood of its happening. In the unlikely event that such a bankruptcy does happen however, here is an overview of the process.

As a quick review, I would like to restate that mortgage-backed securities are the result of a process of securitization that takes place when a real estate lender sells a package of its loans to an entity, called and SPE. The SPE receives the money to purchase the loans from the sale of either securities, beneficial interests in the entity or trust certificates from a trust set-up to hold the loans. If securities or trust certificates are sold, they are called mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Through the securitization process, real estate lenders are provided with cash to originate more loans and investors are able to purchase MBS and invest in the real estate market without having to hold real property. If you question why one would want to invest in the real estate market at all, please see my earlier post, “Why I Choose Real Estate.”

Tuesday, February 24, 2015

Lender Bankruptcy and Mortgage-Backed Securitization

Mortgage-backed securitization is an essential part of the mortgage secondary market, as it provides both liquidity and expanded sources of funding for real estate lender. Securitization also allows for more widespread participation in the real estate market, since MBS bonds are an asset class that can be held by classes of investors that are restricted by law from retaining extended ownership in real property. More participation in the real estate secondary market, of course, translates to a more robust market with more available real estate funding and more real estate activity.

Despite its role in the market down-turn of 2007/2008, securitization of real estate assets has been and continues to be an important part of the U.S. real estate finance market. Securitization, however, heavily depends on a bankruptcy remote structure.